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Abstract 
We present the first estimates of the causal effects of SSDI receipt on labor supply that are 
generalizable to the entire population of program entrants in the present day system. We 
take advantage of a unique workload management database to match Social Security 
Disability Insurance (SSDI) applicants to disability examiners, and use natural variation in 
examiners’ allowance rates to estimate the labor supply effects of SSDI. Because applicants 
are randomly assigned to examiners (conditional on observable characteristics), examiner 
specific allowance rates can be used to instrument for the allowance decision in a labor 
supply equation contrasting denied vs. allowed applicants. We find that the labor force 
participation rate of the marginal entrant would be on average 21 percentage points greater 
in the absence of SSDI benefit receipt. His or her likelihood of engaging in substantial 
gainful activity as defined by the SSDI program would be on average 13 percentage points 
higher, and he or she would earn $1,600 to $2,600 more per year on average in the absence 
of SSDI benefit receipt. The marginal entrant is likely to have a mental impairment, be 
young, and have low pre-onset earnings. Importantly, the disincentive effect varies across 
individuals with impairments of different degrees of unobservable severity, ranging from a 
low of 10 percentage points for those with more severe impairments to a high of 60 
percentage points for entrants with relatively less severe impairments. 
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1. Introduction 
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) is intended to replace lost income for 
individuals suffering substantial long-term losses in earnings capacity due to the onset of a 
disability. Specifically, it is targeted at individuals who suffer a long-lasting impairment that 
prevents work. Yet, the dramatic rise in the SSDI caseload over the last two decades and the 
attendant compositional shift toward disabilities with greater diagnostic uncertainty – along with 
medical advancement and mandated workplace accommodation for individuals with disabilities 
– have led many to question whether some SSDI beneficiaries could actually work if they 
wanted to do so. Recent and proposed policies have attempted to encourage work among 
beneficiaries. For example, the Ticket to Work Incentive and Work Incentives Improvement Act 
(Ticket Act) in 1999 provided vouchers (or ―tickets‖) for individuals interested in obtaining 
vocational rehabilitation and employment services. In addition, the Ticket Act directed the Social 
Security Administration (SSA) to study the impact of reducing the program’s very high implicit 
tax rate on earnings by gradually phasing out benefits as earnings rise instead of the current 
policy of suspending the entire benefit when earnings exceed a disregard level.  
A key parameter for understanding the likely effects of policies to encourage work 
among SSDI beneficiaries is the disincentive effect of SSDI on the labor force participation and 
earnings of recipients. To obtain a causal estimate of the disincentive effect, one needs an 
estimate of the counterfactual earnings of SSDI beneficiaries.  In this paper, we construct a 
causal estimate of the disincentive effect of SSDI by comparing the subsequent labor supply of 
otherwise similar applicants who were initially allowed or denied benefits only because their 
applications were randomly assigned to disability examiners with different allowance 
propensities at the initial point in the disability determination process.  To do this, we use a 
unique administrative data set that has been underused by researchers and contains disability 
examiner identification codes for the universe of SSDI applications in a given year. Because the 
disability determination process allows for multiple levels of appeal, we employ an intention-to-
treat framework (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996) in which we use an examiner’s allowance 
propensity in the initial determination stage as an instrumental variable for the ultimate 
allowance decision for a given application. The ultimate allowance decision may coincide with 
the initial determination or, if the initial determination was appealed, the decision rendered on 
appeal.  We link the applications data to administrative earnings records and examine labor 
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supply outcomes 2 to 4 years from the date of the initial determination. By waiting  two or more 
years to measure labor supply outcomes, we address the possibility that some initially denied 
applicants may intentionally keep their earnings low during the appeals process.  
Our instrumental variable enables us to estimate a local average treatment effect (LATE) 
for the marginal entrant, where ―treatment‖ refers to DI receipt. That is, our estimate is relevant 
for ―compliers‖ or those whose treatment status could be changed because they were assigned to 
a particular examiner (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). We estimate that almost a quarter of 
applicants are on the margin of allowance. We find that labor force participation of the marginal 
entrant would be on average 21 percentage points greater in the absence of SSDI benefit receipt 
(i.e., if their application had been denied). His or her likelihood of engaging in substantial 
gainful activity (SGA), defined by the SSDI program as earning more than $980 per month in 
2009, would be on average 13 percentage points higher, and he or she would earn $1,600 to 
$2,600 more per year on average in the absence of SSDI benefit receipt. We also investigate the 
characteristics of the marginal SSDI entrant, on the margin of an initial allowance in the present 
system; we find that the marginal entrant is more likely to have a mental impairment, is younger, 
and has pre-disability onset earnings in the lowest earnings quintile. 
In a world with homogeneous treatment effects conditional on application, LATE 
generalizes to the average treatment effect (ATE) – the causal effect of DI receipt on the labor 
supply of all applicants – and the average effect of treatment on the treated (TT) – the causal 
effect of DI receipt on beneficiaries in particular. The unique nature of our instrument, combined 
with data on the universe of applicants, presents an unprecedented opportunity to test for 
heterogeneous treatment effects and evaluate the generalizability of previous estimates in the 
literature.  First, we estimate local average treatment effects for subpopulations defined by 
observable characteristics such as impairment type, age, and prior earnings, and find evidence of 
a heterogeneous treatment effect. Next, we push this line of investigation further and test for 
variation in the treatment effect on unobservable dimensions, namely unobserved severity of 
impairment.  As we show later, variation in our continuous instrument (examiner allowance 
propensities) traces out the treatment effect as the allowance threshold is set at different points in 
the distribution of unobserved severity.   
We show that the marginal treatment effect (MTE) is increasing in magnitude in the 
SSDI allowance rate; that is, the disincentive effect of SSDI rises as the allowance threshold is 
 3 
lowered and applicants with less severe impairments are allowed on the program. When the 
allowance threshold is particularly high, such that the allowance rate is ten points lower than in 
the present system, the marginal entrant has a high-severity impairment and SSDI causes a 
modest 10 percentage point reduction in labor force participation. As the allowance threshold is 
relaxed, the disincentive effect grows. When the allowance threshold is particularly low, such 
that the allowance rate is 10 points higher than at present, the marginal entrant has an impairment 
of lesser (unobserved) severity, and SSDI causes a 60 percentage point reduction in labor force 
participation. Our estimates point to markedly greater residual work capacity among applicants 
with less severe impairments, and indicate large potential labor supply effects from policies 
aimed at tightening or relaxing access to SSDI benefits. 
Not surprisingly given its obvious importance, the labor supply disincentive effect of 
SSDI has received a great deal of attention in the economics literature. Bound (1989) first 
proposed using denied applicants as a comparison group for SSDI beneficiaries. He argued that, 
in observational data, the labor supply of denied applicants could be used to estimate an upper 
bound of the effect of SSDI because, although allowed and denied applicants are similar in many 
respects, on average denied applicants should suffer from less severe impairments than allowed 
applicants. He estimated that labor force participation of SSDI beneficiaries would be at most 34 
percentage points higher in the absence of SSDI benefits.
1
 von Wachter, Song and Manchester 
(2010) found that this upper bound has been relatively stable over time, despite changes in the 
composition of SSDI applicants. Gruber and Kubik (1997) took this line of approach a step 
further and exploited state-level variation in a tightening of access to SSDI benefits in the late 
1970s to examine the reduced form relationship between denial rates and labor supply. They 
found that a 10% increase in the state denial rate led to a statistically significant increase in labor 
force participation of 2.8%.   
Two recent studies also estimate an average causal effect of SSDI, but for potentially 
non-representative subpopulations of SSDI entrants. Chen and van der Klaauw (2008) used 
exogenous variation in the SSDI denial rate resulting from a little known program rule that 
effectively relaxes access to SSDI discontinuously at age 55. They found that labor force 
                                                 
1
 Note that this is not the same as saying fewer than 34 percent of beneficiaries would work if the SSDI program did 
not exist. This is only the case if the act of applying for SSDI benefits has no impact on labor supply or earnings. 
Since applying for SSDI requires one to reduce one’s earnings below a low threshold in order to qualify for benefits, 
individuals may lose skills while they wait for a decision or have a hard time obtaining a job after a significant 
absence from the labor market. This was pointed out by Parsons (1991). 
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participation of older beneficiaries would be at most 20 percentage points higher in the absence 
of SSDI. Most recently, and concurrent with our study, French and Song (2009) use variation in 
the propensity of administrative law judges (ALJs) in the second stage of the appeals process to 
estimate the labor supply effect of SSDI receipt. They find that the labor force participation rate 
of applicants allowed at the ALJ hearing level would be at most 14 percentage points higher if 
they had instead been denied.   
While the internal validity of the Chen-van der Klaauw and French-Song studies is high, 
owing to the use of quasi-experimental variation, their generalizability to the full population of 
SSDI entrants is unknown. Importantly, if the causal effect of SSDI on labor supply is not 
constant over the population of SSDI entrants, then these two estimates are local average 
treatment effects that depend critically on the population from which the sample is drawn and the 
margin affected by the instrumental variable. In contrast, our estimates of the average causal 
effects of SSDI generalize to the entire population of marginal entrants under the present day 
system.  
 
2. Background on SSDI 
 The SSDI program defines disability as the ―inability to engage in any substantial gainful 
activity (SGA) by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s) which 
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous 
period of not less than 12 months.‖ Activity is considered ―substantial‖ if it involves significant 
physical and/or mental exertion, and it is considered ―gainful‖ if it is performed for pay or profit 
(whether or not profit is actually realized). SSA operationalizes this definition by setting an 
earnings threshold – currently $1,000 per month – over which individuals are said to be engaging 
in SGA and are therefore disqualified from participating in the program. The SGA threshold 
impacts both program entry (through eligibility) and the labor supply of current beneficiaries 
(whose benefits are suspended if they earn more than the SGA threshold). 
 Individuals apply for SSDI benefits at their local field office, which screens out those 
who are not currently insured or are engaging in SGA. These are included in what is labeled 
―technical denials,‖ and do not receive a medical review. The remaining applications are 
forwarded to a state Disability Determination Services (DDS) office, where cases are assigned to 
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disability examiners for review.  We discuss assignment of applications to examiners in greater 
detail in the Section 3.1 and in the appendix.  
Disability examiners follow a five-step review process in order to determine whether 
applicants are unable to perform SGA given the severity of their impairment and/or vocational 
background (age, education and work experience). Two types of allowances are made: medical 
allowances (at step 3, for individuals with specific impairments deemed severe enough to 
warrant allowance into the program regardless of vocational background) and vocational 
allowances (at step 5, for individuals with impairments severe enough to prevent them from 
performing any SGA in the national economy given their vocational background). Vocational 
allowances are made in consultation with a medical-vocational grid which provides guidance for 
allowance decisions based on residual functional capacity, age group, education and type of 
work experience (i.e., skilled, unskilled). Practically, the grid generates a large increase in the 
allowance rate at age 55 (see Chen and van der Klaauw, 2008, for more details).  Disability 
examiners are not medically trained but may consult with a medical consultant (a physician or 
psychologist) in order to assess an applicant’s residual functional capacity, or ability to work 
given their physical and/or mental impairments. Denials are issued to applicants engaging in 
SGA (step 1), impairments that are obviously temporary and non-severe (step 2), and if the 
individual has the residual functional capacity to perform any of their past jobs (step 4) or any 
work in the current economy (step 5).  
Denied applicants can appeal their initial determination within 60 days by applying for 
reconsideration by the original DDS office.
2
 Applicants denied at reconsideration have an 
additional 60 days to file an appeal to have an administrative law judge (ALJ) review their case. 
The ALJ must consider the application using the same steps in the same order as the initial 
determination, but the applicant may present new information. Applicants denied by an ALJ 
have additional opportunities to appeal to an SSA Appeals Council (AC) and finally to Federal 
Court. In our data, roughly one-third of applicants are allowed in the initial determination 
(divided approximately evenly among the two types of allowances), and just under two-thirds of 
applicants are ultimately awarded SSDI benefits. An audit study performed by the Office of the 
                                                 
2 Since 1999, ten ―prototype‖ states have eliminated the reconsideration step of the appeals process; they are: 
Alabama, Alaska, California (Los Angeles North and Los Angeles), Colorado (West), Louisiana, Michigan, 
Missouri, New Hampshire, New York and Pennsylvania.  
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Inspector General (2008) found that in 2006 the average processing time for cases in the initial 
determination phase was 131 days, or just over a third of a year. Average (cumulative) 
processing times for cases reaching the appeals phases were 279 days (0.76 years) for 
reconsideration, 811 days (2.22 years) for ALJ, 1,053 days (2.88 years) for AC and 1,720 days 
(4.71 years) for Federal Court. Just under a third of cases made it to the ALJ level, where 
approximately 61% of denials were overturned (GAO 2004). Less than 5% of cases progressed 
to the AC level and less than 1% of cases progressed to Federal Court.  
Individuals who apply for SSDI benefits must stop working or reduce their earnings 
below the SGA threshold for a period of five months before they are entitled to receive benefits, 
or until the allowance decision is made (whichever comes later). Up to 19 months of back 
payments are available depending on the onset and allowance decision dates. The average 
monthly benefit was $1,120 in 2009 (Social Security Administration, 2010, Table 36). Once 
benefits commence, beneficiaries begin a nine-month Trial Work Period (TWP) which allows 
individuals to ―test‖ their ability to return to work by relaxing the restriction that earnings may 
not exceed the SGA threshold. The TWP is followed by a three-month Grace Period before 
individuals earning above the SGA threshold have their benefits suspended. Thus, SSDI 
beneficiaries may engage in SGA for up to twelve months (not necessarily consecutively) while 
receiving their full benefits without any penalty. Over the next three years, during an extended 
period of eligibility (EPE) benefits are paid for months in which earnings are below SGA, and 
not paid when earnings are above SGA. Finally, upon reaching the Social Security Full 
Retirement Age, SSDI benefits are automatically converted to Social Security retired worker 
benefits and the SGA earnings restriction is lifted. Very few beneficiaries leave the rolls for a 
reason other than death (35% in 2009) or automatic conversion to retired worker benefits (54%). 
In 2009, only 8% of worker beneficiaries’ benefits were terminated because they no longer 
qualified for benefits; of those, 39% failed a medical review (Continuing Disability Review, or 
CDR) whereas 61% were found to earn more than SGA (Social Security Administration, 2010, 
Table 50). 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
The goal of this paper is to estimate causal models of labor supply of the following form:  
i i i iy X DI u    ,                                                          (1) 
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where iy  is earnings (or labor force participation) of applicant i, iX  denotes observed 
characteristics (e.g., age, type of impairment) that may influence labor supply, 1iDI   if the 
applicant was allowed (i.e., is observed to be a SSDI beneficiary at any time after the initial 
determination), and iu  is an error term.  In observational data, inference is hampered if some 
unobserved characteristic, such as severity of the impairment, impacts both labor supply and 
SSDI allowance. For instance, 
 i i i i iy X DI s      , 
where is  denotes unobserved severity, which can be thought of as the (unobserved part of) 
earnings loss associated with the individual’s impairment, and which is uncorrelated with any 
remaining idiosyncratic element i . Then in the regression above i i iu s    , and if 
[ | ] 0i iE s DI  , ordinary least squares (OLS) regression gives a biased estimate of the average 
treatment effect,  . In particular, OLS estimates [ [ | 1] [ | 0]]i i i iE s DI E s DI     . As 
observed by Bound (1989), assuming 0   and severity positively correlated with SSDI receipt, 
OLS overestimates the magnitude of the coefficient on DI and provides an upper bound on the 
labor supply effect of SSDI. 
 From SSA’s point of view, in an ideal world SSDI is awarded to individuals whose 
potential earnings – in the absence of SSDI benefits – are less than the SGA threshold: 
 i i iX s SGA    . 
In practice, however, cases are assigned to disability examiners who have imperfect information, 
and so the assignment rule becomes based on the contrast: 
 ˆi ijX s SGA   , 
where îjs  denotes the estimate by examiner j of the severity of individual i's impairment. This 
estimate is a function of both the individual’s impairment severity – which the examiner 
observes in greater detail than the econometrician, through medical records and test results – and 
characteristics of the examiner assigned to the case, such as previous experience or personal 
perceptions/tastes. Let 
 îj i j ijs s     , 
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where 
j  denotes a systematic component of examiner judgment that leads some examiners to 
over- or underestimate severity of applicants on average and 
ij  denotes an independent and 
identically distributed (i.i.d.) idiosyncratic element uncorrelated with either severity or 
j . Then 
the assignment rule becomes 
1( )i i ij i jDI s X SGA       ,                                                         (2)  
which implies that examiner j’s allowance propensity conditional on applicant characteristics is 
( ) 1 ( )j i s i jP X F X SGA      ,                                                        (3) 
where sF   denotes the cumulative distribution function for unobserved severity plus 
idiosyncratic examiner error, ijv , which is assumed to be i.i.d. within and across examiners.  
Equations 2 and 3 show that high-
j  examiners systematically overestimate severity, resulting 
in lower allowance thresholds and higher propensities to allow applicants conditional on 
applicant characteristics. This implies a natural identification strategy for estimating the labor 
supply effect of SSDI. In particular, we implement an instrumental variables (IV) estimation 
strategy where we instrument for SSDI receipt in Equation 1 using assigned examiner’s 
propensity jP .
3
    
In order to avoid biasing measurement of examiner propensities using the applicant’s 















Intuitively, EXALLOW measures the allowance rate of examiner j, to whom applicant i was 
assigned, for all cases except for the case of applicant i himself. Thus, conditional on observed 
characteristics and assuming conditional random assignment, which we discuss further below, 
EXALLOW should only be positively correlated with the applicant’s own award decision if 
there exists an underlying examiner-specific threshold for allowance decisions.  
                                                 
3
 The estimation strategy we employ is similar to that used by Kling (2006) to examine the effect of incarceration on 
labor supply and earnings, Doyle (2007, 2008) to examine the effects of foster care placement on juvenile 
delinquency and adult crime, and Perry (2008) to examine the effect of treatment of maternal depression on 
management of children’s asthma.  
4
 An alternative approach would be to regress allowance decisions on a full set of examiner fixed effects in the first 
stage. A disadvantage of this approach is that IV is then susceptible to a ―many weak instruments‖ problem (Stock, 
Wright and Yogo 2002). In addition, our formulation of examiner allowance propensity as a continuous instrumental 
variable has the advantage of allowing us to compute marginal treatment effects, as can be seen below. 
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  Since appeals are likely to be non-random, we adopt an intention-to-treat framework, in 
which assignment to disability examiner in the initial determination process is used to instrument 
for the ultimate award decision. Disability examiners are characterized by their caseload-level 
initial allowance rate, and initial determinations may differ from final determinations as a result 
of appeals.  
 
3.1. Conditional Random Assignment and Monotonicity Assumptions 
In order for EXALLOW to be a valid instrument for DI receipt, applicants’ assignment to 
DDS examiner must be uncorrelated with unobserved severity conditional on observed 
characteristics. This amounts to an assumption of conditional random assignment to DDS 
examiner within a DDS. That is, at most, examiners may specialize in a particular type of 
impairment (e.g., mental disorders) or age group, but within this type, examiners do not further 
specialize in cases of either low or high severity.   
This assumption is plausible. Interviews with managers of twelve of the largest DDS 
offices revealed that nearly all cases are automatically assigned to examiners by a computer 
program that assigns new applications to examiners based on availability.
5
  Managers at the 
DDSs variously described this process as a ―round robin,‖ ―next in line,‖ ―rotate to the back,‖ or 
―equal distribution‖ system. Our appendix describes the assignment based on this computer 
program in more detail. 
An exception to the availability-based assignment process is that a small percent of cases 
are sent by the field offices with high-priority flags for expedited handling, and these are 
sometimes manually assigned to examiners that tend to specialize in high-priority cases.  The 
most common high-priority case during our study period is an allegation of terminal illness, and 
these cases are almost always allowed in the initial determination.  Nonetheless, we estimate that 
this potentially non-random assignment occurred for less than 0.5 percent of applications in our 
sample simply because these applicants do not survive through the end of the second year after 
their initial determination (i.e., long enough for us to measure post-decision labor supply 
outcomes).  In addition, since terminal illness cases are heavily concentrated in certain 
                                                 
5
 Even prior to the age of computer assignment, there is evidence that cases were essentially randomly assigned to 
examiners. See, for example, Lewin Group, Inc. (2001), which conducted site visits in 1999 as part of a study on the 








A second assumption that is critical to our interpretation of our IV estimates is the 
assumption that examiners’ award propensities affect applicants’ chances of DI receipt in the 
same way (monotonicity). In other words, we assume that cases allowed by ―strict‖ examiners 
(those with low
j ’s) would also have been allowed by ―lenient‖ examiners (those with high j
’s), and that cases denied by lenient examiners would also have been denied by strict examiners. 
While not strictly testable without a well-designed audit study, this assumption implies that 
denials by strict examiners should be more likely to be overturned on appeal than denials by 
lenient examiners, and thus the instrument is likely to have a weaker effect on individuals 
assigned to strict examiners. Below we provide evidence that the strength of the first stage 
increases with examiner leniency. A second implication of the monotonicity assumption is that 
examiners who are ―strict‖ on one type of case, say musculoskeletal, are also strict on any other 
type of case, say mental disorders. We test this implication below, and find evidence that 
supports the assumption of monotonicity. 
 
3.2. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
 In the case where treatment effects are heterogeneous (i.e., replace   in Equation 1 with 
i to allow it to vary across individuals) then an IV estimator using initial allowance propensities 
as an instrument for ultimate allowance decisions will estimate a local average treatment effect 
(LATE) where the causal effect of DI receipt on labor supply decisions ( i ) is averaged over 
―compliers,‖ or applicants whose treatment status could be changed as a result of assignment to a 
particular examiner.  On the other hand, our instrumental variable is not informative for ―always 
takers‖ – those who would be allowed, whether initially or upon appeal, even if assigned to the 
strictest examiner – or ―never takers‖ – those who would be denied even if assigned to the most 
lenient examiner. Thus, we estimate the average causal effect of SSDI for the marginal entrant 
who is just on the margin of being allowed or denied under the current system.  
                                                 
6
 In particular, eight types of cancers and some other conditions are automatically classified as Terminal Illness 
cases, but other diagnoses may also receive this classification if the condition is untreatable.  
7
 Note that if we do not completely control for nonrandom assignment based on applicant characteristics that are 
correlated with labor supply outcomes, this will tend to bias our estimates in the direction of OLS. In that case, our 
estimates can be interpreted as a tighter upper bound on the labor supply effects of SSDI. 
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Importantly, if the treatment effect is heterogeneous, then the population on which the 
estimate is based is key to understanding the extent to which the estimate generalizes to the 
broader SSDI population. In this paper, we use data on the universe of applicants for whom an 
initial medical determination is made, whereas other studies use data on specific subsets of the 
applicant population. For example, Chen and van der Klaauw’s (2008) estimate is relevant for 
individuals on the eve of turning age 55 who are also on the margin of a vocational allowance – 
that is, individuals in the middle of the severity distribution, once obvious denials (at step 2) and 
obvious allowances (at step 3) have been removed from the application pool.  
By contrast, French and Song (2009) estimate labor supply effects for the set of 
individuals denied in both the initial determination and reconsideration stages who appeal their 
decision to an ALJ. As a result, their sample excludes individuals assigned to relatively lenient 
DDS examiners, who were awarded disability benefits, as well as individuals assigned to 
relatively strict DDS examiners, who were denied benefits but who did not appeal the initial 
determination. This last group includes those whose expectation of a reversal is low (individuals 
with lower severity) or those who have a higher opportunity cost of remaining out of the labor 
force for two or more years). Practically, this suggests that their estimate should be lower than 
the average treatment effect for all applicants on the margin of allowance at the initial 
determination stage, as their sample includes individuals with higher severity and lower 
opportunity costs of appeal (e.g., lower potential earnings).
8
 At the same time, their estimate is 
relevant for policies aimed at reforming the appeals process holding fixed the current DDS 
determination process.  
 Because our data set includes the entire population of program applicants, we can test for 
a heterogeneous treatment effect on the basis of both observable and unobservable 
characteristics. We test for heterogeneity on the basis of observable characteristics by estimating 
the IV model above separately for groups of applicants defined by impairment type, age, and 
pre-disability earnings quintile.  
 We test for heterogeneity on the basis of unobservables by noting that the continuous 
nature of our instrument enables us to estimate the marginal treatment effect (MTE) i  
                                                 
8
 In the meantime, these individuals may also have lost a substantial amount of human capital while remaining out 
of the labor market, so that denied applicants at this stage may have an even harder time finding a job than the 
average denied applicant in the aftermath of a negative decision. 
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(Heckman, Urzua, Vytlacil, 2006).  Note that the MTE is the treatment effect for the marginal 
entrant with severity 
i i j ijs X SGA v     . Then the MTE estimated at different predicted 
probabilities of SSDI receipt generated by the instrument ( )j iP X  implicitly traces out the 
marginal treatment effect at different points in the distribution of unobserved severity. In 
particular, we can interpret the MTE computed at low values of predicted SSDI receipt as the 
MTE for high severity applicants, and vice versa. Practically, computation of the MTE can be 
accomplished by computing numerical derivatives of a smoothed function relating mean labor 
supply outcome, iy , to the predicted probability of SSDI receipt.  
Finally, while it is reasonable to expect that the disincentive effect, i , may be related to 
unobserved severity, is , these are two distinctly different concepts. Whereas is  denotes the 
expected earnings difference between two otherwise identical individuals, one of whom is 
disabled while the other is not, by contrast i  denotes the expected earnings difference between 
two individuals with the same severity of impairment, one of whom is receiving disability 
benefits while the other is not. A priori it is not clear what the expected relationship between i  
and is  should be, but if we interpret the disincentive effect of SSDI as a measure of the residual 
work capacity of applicant i, then a reasonable prior is that i is an increasing function of is ; in 
other words, the magnitude of the disincentive effect is decreasing in is . 
 
4. Data and Caseload Characteristics 
We make use of a unique workload management database called the Disability 
Operational Data Store (DIODS). The DIODS contains the universe of SSDI applications, and 
according to Social Security Online, is considered ―the SSA definitive data store for disability 
claims for state agency workload management purposes.‖
9
 The DIODS contains alphanumeric 
codes that identify disability examiners uniquely within DDS and allows us to construct a 
measure of each examiner’s propensity to allow SSDI applicants. We use data on all initial 
medical determinations (that is, excluding technical denials) made between January 1, 2005, and 
December 31, 2006. We construct our sample by restricting to primary claimants (i.e., excluding 
dependents) between the ages of 18 and 64 who were assigned to examiners handling at least 10 
                                                 
9
 http://www.socialsecurity.gov/disability/data/ssa-sa-mowl.htm  
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cases in the observed time frame.
10,11
 We link the applicant data to SSA’s Master Beneficiary 
Record (MBR) in order to identify which applicants ultimately received SSDI benefits (by the 
end of 2009), which may differ from the initial decision due to the appeals process.  
To examine past and subsequent labor supply, we link the applications data to 
administrative annual earnings records between 1995 and 2009 from SSA’s Detailed Earnings 
Record (DER). The DER contains uncapped earnings from box 5 (Medicare wages and tips) of 
individuals’ W-2 forms. We aggregate across all earnings reports to measure earnings at the 
individual level. This gives us annual earnings up to nine years before and 2-4 years after the 
initial decision.
12
 We examine labor supply and earnings at least two years after the initial 
decision to allow most of the denied applicants to clear the appeals process. Finally, we link the 
sample to SSA’s Numerical Identification System (Numident) file, which contains dates of death 
for individuals who died during our sample period. We restrict the analysis samples to 
individuals who were alive through the end of the calendar year in which earnings are observed.   
 In 2005 and 2006, approximately 2.1 million applicants per year submitted claims for 
SSDI benefits, and roughly 600,000 of these resulted in technical denials (Social Security 
Administration, 2010, Table 59). The remaining 1.5 million applications in a year were sent to a 
DDS for a medical/vocational determination, and these appear in our data set. After imposing the 
sample restrictions discussed above and removing duplicate claims, we obtain a sample of just 
under 2.4 million observations for 2005 and 2006 combined. These cases were adjudicated by 
7,193 DDS examiners.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the applicant data set, overall and by case 
disposition. We divide the sample into four groups: 1) initially allowed, 2) initially denied, but 
allowed on appeal, 3) initially denied, and denied on appeal, and 4) initially denied, and not 
observed to appeal.
13
 Approximately 38% of applicants denied at the initial determination level 
do not appeal their decision. However, among those who appeal, the success rate is fairly high – 
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 Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish between full- and part-time examiners, nor can we observe examiner tenure. 
11
 One DDS manager indicated that trainees all have the same examiner code in the DIODS for her DDS. Although 
we do not believe this practice to be widespread, we eliminate the 25 examiner codes with the largest numbers of 
decisions in order to avoid this potential problem. 
12
 We observe earnings up to three years after the initial decision for the full sample, and up to four years later for 
2005 applicants. 
13
 We identify individuals who appeal by matching initial applications to cases presented to administrative law 
judges. Thus, group 4 includes some individuals who appealed for reconsideration, but upon denial at that stage, 
declined to appeal further. 
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fully three-quarters of these denials are overturned. Fifty-nine percent of applications are for one 
of two types of impairments: musculoskeletal (37%) or mental disorders (22%). These 
percentages are virtually the same among all allowances, although musculoskeletal (mental) 
cases are less (more) likely to be allowed at the initial determination level. 
Note that the four groups are distinctly different from one another in terms of observable 
characteristics. For example, ultimately denied applicants resemble those who were initially 
denied but allowed on appeal in terms of body system affected by the impairment (e.g., 
musculoskeletal, mental), but differ substantially from the initially allowed. Yet, ultimately 
denied applicants tend to have less severe impairments (as determined in the initial review 
process); that is, they were generally more likely to be denied in the earlier stages of the review 
process than those awarded SSDI benefits on appeal. Note that applicants who were initially 
denied and declined to appeal their decision were most likely to have been rejected at step 2 of 
the determination process. Moreover, denied applicants tend to be younger and have lower initial 
earnings than both initially allowed beneficiaries and those allowed on appeal.  
Figures 1-3 provide a first look at the labor supply and earnings of applicants before and 
after their initial determination. We use two measures of labor supply: 1) labor force 
participation – defined as earning more than $1,000 in a given year;
14
 and 2) engaging in SGA 
(where the SGA threshold is that defined by SSA in a given year).
15
 We also present mean 
earnings before and after the initial decision for each group. All earnings amounts are presented 
in 2008 dollars, and include zeros. From Figure 1, we see that applicants allowed on appeal are 
very similar to applicants allowed in the initial determination in terms of their labor force 
participation before the initial determination, with a labor force participation rate of 
approximately 90% between 3 and 5 years before the initial decision. Both groups’ labor supply 
drops significantly one year after the initial decision, although initially denied applicants are 
about five percentage points more likely to work than initially allowed applicants. By two years 
after the decision, however, the two groups are virtually indistinguishable, with labor force 
participation rates around 14% between two and three years after the initial decision.  
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 Because any positive earnings result in a W-2 report, we observe many individuals with very small annual 
earnings. We impose the $1,000 earnings threshold to restrict our definition of labor force participation to only 
―meaningful‖ participation in the labor market. 
15
 Note that, since 2000, the SGA threshold has been indexed to average annual wages. However, prior to 2000, the 
threshold was set nominally and raised infrequently. The SGA threshold was $500 per month in the 1990s and rose 
to $700 per month in 1999.  
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By contrast, ultimately denied applicants have lower labor force participation to begin 
with – between 73% and 80% three to five years before the initial determination – and 
significantly higher (albeit reduced) participation rates of around 50% after the initial 
determination.
16
 Although denied applicants who appeal (unsuccessfully) and those who decline 
to appeal have similar pre-decision labor force participation rates, their post-decision labor force 
participation differs substantially. Specifically, only about 40% of individuals who appealed 
unsuccessfully are working three years after their initial determination. Given average 
cumulative processing times from the start of the process, few of these applicants are likely to be 
still awaiting a decision (and hence suppressing labor supply) particularly when the outcome is 
measured in the third or fourth year after the initial decision. Rather, it likely reflects selection 
into the appeals process; that is, individuals with less severe impairments are more likely to opt 
out of the appeals process.  
Moreover, note that the difference in prior labor force participation between ultimately 
allowed and denied applicants is consistent with selection on non-health factors into the 
applicant population. If individuals with low labor supply prior to disability onset have lower 
opportunity costs of applying, they will be more likely to apply for a given level of health, and as 
a result prior labor supply and health will be negatively correlated among applicants. The 
relationship between prior labor market history and ultimate disposition of the case becomes 
even more pronounced when examining the percent of applicants engaging in SGA (e.g., earning 
more than $11,760 per year in 2009) (see Figure 2) and average earnings (Figure 3). 
Interestingly, Figure 3 suggests there is little difference in prior labor market history between 
denied applicants who choose to appeal and are unsuccessful, and those who decline to appeal.  
Consistent with the earlier evidence from Bound (1989), Figure 1 suggests that labor 
force participation rates among allowed applicants would be at most 35 percentage points higher 
in the absence of SSDI, assuming allowed applicants suffer more severe impairments (i.e., with 
greater losses in earning power) than denied applicants. Similarly, allowed applicants would be 
at most 21 percentage points more likely to engage in SGA, and would earn at most $8500 per 
year, if they did not receive SSDI benefits. Regression analysis would allow one to correct these 
estimates for differences between the two groups in observable factors such as prior earnings, but 
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 Recall from Table 1 that approximately 70% of those ultimately denied benefits did not appeal the initial 
determination. 
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it would not be able to correct for differences in unobservable factors such as severity of the 
impairment, which is positively correlated with SSDI receipt. To circumvent this problem, we 
propose using exogenous variation in examiner-specific allowance rates to instrument for the 
allowance decision in a regression of labor supply (earnings) on SSDI receipt.  
 
5. Initial Outcomes in the Disability Determination Process 
Although consistent treatment of similarly situated individuals is an important principle 
in any evaluative system, some degree of variation in outcomes is inevitable.  In other settings, 
variation in outcomes has been associated with case complexity, dynamism of the subject matter, 
size of caseload, resources to assist decision-making, attributes of the evaluators such as their 
prior experiences, and training and guidance provided to evaluators (Ramji-Nogales, 
Schoenholtz and Schrag, 2007; Legomsky, 2007). Indeed, DDS examiners are called on to 
evaluate and weigh many aspects of complex cases against extensive medical and vocational 
criteria in a dynamic medical environment. They have heavy caseloads and are not trained 
physicians (although they may consult with physicians). These factors point to the importance of 
examiner judgment. SSA has sponsored a number of studies examining variation in allowance 
rates across DDS examiners, states and adjudicative levels. In a seminal study, Nagi (1969) 
commissioned an expert panel to perform external audits on a sample of SSDI applications and 
found that the panel agreed with the original award decision in just under 70% of cases. In a 
similar study, Gallicchio and Bye (1981) replicated a sample of claims decisions both within and 
between states, and found that within-state disagreements were in many cases as large or larger 
than disagreements between states.  
Our research design takes advantage of this natural and systematic variation in allowance 
rates across individual examiners within the same state DDS office. To examine whether there is 
sufficient variation across examiners, we construct a measure of initial allowance rates among 
cases decided by a given DDS examiner between 2005 and 2006. In our sample, 90% of 
examiners are observed to handle more than 29 initial applications, and the median number is 
215. Figure 4 presents a histogram of examiners’ deviation from the overall allowance rate 
(within DDS office), both unadjusted and regression-adjusted for differences in case mix. Case 
controls include the fraction of cases in a given age group, diagnosis code or month, as well as a 
variable measuring average prior earnings of applicants assigned to a given examiner. As 
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expected, adjusting for case mix reduces the standard deviation, from 0.0968 to 0.0668, and 
removes the thick right tail. After adjustment, one-third of examiners have allowance rates more 
than 7 percentage points above or below the average allowance rate for a given case type, and 
5% of examiners have allowance rates more than 13 percentage points above or below the 
average.  
Figure 5 is a graphical depiction of our instrumental variables estimation strategy. We 
separately plot smoothed SSDI receipt and labor force participation rates by examiner’s 
residualized (regression-adjusted) initial allowance rate (with dashed lines indicating 95% 
confidence interval bands) estimated via local quadratic regression. SSDI receipt is increasing in 
the residualized initial allowance rate, but its slope is less than one on account of the appeals 
process. Its slope is also increasing in the residualized initial allowance rate since individuals 
initially denied by strict examiners are more likely to ultimately obtain benefits on appeal than 
individuals initially denied by lenient examiners. This pattern is consistent with monotonicity.  
While SSDI receipt rises with the examiner’s allowance propensity, the labor force 
participation rate of applicants two years after the initial decision falls, from 28% among 
individuals assigned to tough examiners to 24% among individuals assigned to lenient 
examiners. Moreover, the rate at which labor force participation falls is related to the rate at 
which SSDI receipt increases; where the relationship between SSDI receipt and the initial 
allowance rate is relatively flat, labor force participation is also flat and only begins to decrease 
as DI receipt increases.  
Table 2 presents the estimated coefficient on EXALLOW in a regression of individual 
allowance decisions, with and without covariates. We present results for 2005 and 2006, 
separately as well as pooled. All models include DDS dummies to account for stratification of 
examiners across DDS offices. We present t-statistics in parentheses, where robust standard 
errors are computed and clustered by DDS examiner. Column 1 presents the coefficient on 
EXALLOW with no additional covariates. In both years, a 10 percentage point increase in initial 
examiner allowance rate results in just over a three percentage point increase in one’s own 
probability of ultimately receiving DI. Adding covariates sequentially to the regression allows us 
to indirectly test for random assignment on the basis of observable characteristics because only 
covariates that are correlated with EXALLOW (our ―leave oneself out‖ measure of allowance 
propensity) will affect the estimated coefficient on EXALLOW when included.   Adding a finer 
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measure of geography by grouping individuals by the first three digits of their zip code (Column 
2) does little to change the estimated coefficient, suggesting that examiners do not tend to 
specialize in a given geographic area within a DDS region. Because including the roughly 900 




The next two columns (3-4) add body system codes and diagnosis codes, respectively. 
Both of these sets of variables have an impact on the coefficient on EXALLOW, suggesting that 
some type of specialization according to impairment type is practiced in at least some DDS 
offices. This may be deliberate (e.g., an examiner tends to focus on high-priority cancer cases ) 
or indirect (e.g., if certain types of cases are more difficult to process on average, and as a result 
they are assigned to more experienced examiners). In any case, this suggests that conditioning on 
impairment type is critical to our identification strategy.
18
 Finally, controlling for age, average 
previous earnings and seasonality has very little impact on the estimated effect of the instrument 
on individual allowance decisions.
19
 This suggests that, once one conditions on impairment type, 
applicants are approximately randomly assigned to examiners.  
Conditional on observables, examiner allowance rates are strongly correlated with 
individual allowance decisions: a 10 percentage point increase in the examiner allowance rate is 
associated with a statistically significant (p<0.0001) 2.3 percentage point increase in individuals’ 
allowance decisions.
20
 Note that in the case of a binary treatment, the first stage estimate also 
gives an estimate of the proportion of the sample who are compliers.
21
 Thus, we estimate that 
approximately 23% of applicants represent ―marginal‖ cases whose disposition depends on 
examiner assignment. By contrast, 77% of applicants would either be allowed or denied 
regardless of examiner assignment. 
To test the assumption that examiners’ generic allowance rates can be used to instrument 
for allowances across all types of cases, we performed the following test. First, we computed 
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 Since it is plausible that three-digit zip code could matter for labor supply outcomes (e.g., if local employment 
opportunities were correlated sufficiently with SSDI receipt, regardless of their impact on EXALLOW), we ran a 
subset of models for the labor supply outcomes with three-digit zip codes included and found that they did not affect 
those estimates either. 
18
 Impairment type is incompletely measured where there are multiple diagnoses. 
19
 It would also be useful to examine the effect of examiner characteristics (such as job tenure or holding Single 
Decision Maker authority) on examiner allowance rates, but we do not observe this information in our data.  
20
 Recall that in a model with one endogenous regressor and one instrument the t-statistic squared is equal to the 
incremental F statistic. 
21
 In our case, the proportion of compliers equals Pr(DI=1|EXALLOW=1)-Pr(DI=1|EXALLOW=0). 
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examiner allowance rates across all types of cases except cases with the same body system code. 
Then we regressed SSDI receipt for cases of the same body system on this new ―leave body 
system out‖ measure of initial allowance rate. For example, we examine whether SSDI receipt 
for musculoskeletal cases is predicted by examiners’ propensities to allow all other types of cases 
(mental, cardiovascular, etc.). Table 3 presents these estimates. While the strength of the 
instrument varies across impairment types, it is positive and statistically significant in all cases.  
This body of evidence suggests that examiner allowance rates can be used effectively as 
an instrumental variable for individual allowance decisions.  
 
6. Results 
6.1. Effects of SSDI Receipt on Labor Supply and Earnings of the Marginal Entrant 
Table 4 presents results for the labor supply regressions estimated by OLS and IV. We 
model three outcomes: labor force participation (defined as earning more than $1,000/year), 
engagement in SGA (i.e., earning more than $11,760 per year in 2009), and annual earnings. We 
measure all labor supply outcomes two and three years after the initial decision, for applicants 
whose initial determination took place in 2005 or 2006, and we also examine outcomes four 
years later for those receiving an initial determination in 2005. In all models, we control for a 
rich set of covariates that include geography (DDS codes), characteristics of the impairment 
(diagnosis codes), age, prior labor market history, and seasonality (month of application).  
In most cases, adjusting for differences in observable characteristics between denied and 
allowed applicants via OLS does little to change estimates of the labor supply effect of SSDI 
based on comparisons of raw means. However, adjusting for unobservable differences (e.g., in 
severity of the impairment(s)) has a large impact on the estimated labor supply effect. Consistent 
with the idea that severity is positively correlated with DI receipt and the idea that OLS estimates 
an upper bound on the labor supply effect, the OLS estimates are all statistically significantly and 
substantively larger in magnitude than the IV estimates.  
Table 4 shows that despite their impairments, 14% to 15% of SSDI beneficiaries 
participated in the labor market – earning more than $1,000 in a given year – two years after 
their initial determination. Among denied applicants, roughly one-half worked two years after 
their initial determination. Adjusting for differences in observable characteristics such as 
impairment type, age or prior labor market history yields an estimated effect of SSDI receipt on 
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labor force participation of approximately 31-34 percentage points (the OLS coefficient). This is 
almost identical to Bound’s (1989) estimates using data from the 1972 Survey of Disabled and 
Non-Disabled Adults and the 1978 Survey of Disability and Work. In other words, no more than 
half of SSDI beneficiaries would be likely to engage in any labor market activity if they did not 
participate in the SSDI program. Moreover, applying our IV identification strategy – which 
allows us to adjust for differences in unobservable characteristics in addition to differences in 
observable characteristics between the two groups – yields smaller coefficient estimates, between 
21 and 22 percentage points after two years.  
Note that while estimates of the effect after two years are similar for applicants with 2005 
and 2006 determinations, estimates of the effect after three years are divergent: 17 percentage 
points for individuals with decisions received in 2005 (and thus labor force participation 
measured in 2008) vs. 14 percentage points for individuals with decisions received in 2006 
(labor force participation measured in 2009). Furthermore, Figure 6 illustrates that the estimated 
coefficients display an unexpected pattern where they decline in magnitude as time since the 
initial determination increases. This pattern is not due to the phenomenon of denied applicants 
strategically depressing labor supply while waiting for a decision on appeal, since as appealed 
cases resolve over time and some denied appellants return to the labor market, our estimates of 
the labor supply effects of SSDI receipt should increase in magnitude over time rather than 
decrease.  
A plausible explanation for these patterns is that the estimated effect of SSDI receipt on 
labor force participation reflects both the supply of and demand for disabled workers, and that as 
the financial crisis deepened and the economy worsened between 2007 and 2009, it became 
harder for denied applicants to find employment, even if they were willing and able to work. In 
the time period over which we observe labor supply, the national unemployment rate 
skyrocketed from roughly 5% to more than 9.5% between the beginning and end of 2008; in 
contrast, note that the unemployment rate fluctuated relatively steadily between 4% and 6% 
between 2001 and the beginning of 2008. As a result, we focus on our two-year estimates of 
approximately 21 percentage points as representative of the effect of SSDI receipt on labor force 
participation under ―average‖ economic conditions. This facilitates comparison of our estimate 
with previous estimates in the literature that were generated under similar economic conditions.   
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To more fully understand the magnitude of our estimates it is useful to translate our 
percentage point effect into a percent effect by dividing by the appropriate baseline labor force 
participation rate. Because we estimate the average effect of SSDI receipt over the population of 
―marginal entrants,‖ this is not straightforward. In particular, because the marginal entrant is 
likely to be less healthy than the average denied applicant, then the labor force participation rate 
of all denied applicants is likely to be an upper bound for the labor force participation of the 
marginal entrant in the absence of SSDI. As a result, the estimated labor supply effect as a 
percent of average labor force participation among denied applicants represents a lower bound 
on the magnitude of the effect. Similarly, comparing the point estimate to the labor supply of 
beneficiaries will give an upper bound on the magnitude of the effect.
22
 Thus, we find that the 
estimated effect of SSDI receipt among marginal applicants is large – between 42% and 140% of 
baseline labor force participation. 
As noted earlier, SSA suspends SSDI benefits for individuals earning more than the SGA 
threshold, which in 2009 was set at $980 per month, or $11,760 per year. However, SSA first 
gives beneficiaries the opportunity to ―test‖ their ability to return to work by allowing them to 
engage in SGA for at least twelve months (during the nine-month TWP and three-month Grace 
Period). Because the TWP and Grace Period are not necessarily consecutive, it is possible to 
observe SSDI beneficiaries engaging in SGA more than 2 years after their initial determination, 
and indeed Table 4 shows that 4-5% of beneficiaries earned more than the annualized SGA 
threshold in a given year.
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Somewhat surprisingly, however, less than 30% of denied applicants 
were performing substantial gainful activity up to four years after their initial determination. IV 
estimates of the effect of SSDI receipt on earning more than the SGA threshold are 11-13 
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 Abadie (2003) has developed a method to estimate the counterfactual labor supply of the marginal applicant, but 
the method depends on having a binary instrument. Rather than discretize our instrument, we chose to bound the 
size of the effect.   
23
  Note that, because of the earnings restriction, these are unlikely to be the same beneficiaries engaging in SGA in 
more than one year. 
24
 Note that since we are using administrative earnings records, it is possible that we are undercounting earnings that 
are ―under the table,‖ or not reported to the government. Since this underreporting is more likely to be prevalent 
among SSDI beneficiaries whose earnings are restricted, this would tend to bias our estimated effect away from 
zero. By the same token, we may be overstating the upper bound on the magnitude of the effect. 
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 Finally, we examine average earnings losses associated with SSDI receipt. Table 4 shows 
that mean annual earnings of SSDI beneficiaries are between approximately $1,500 and $2,000 
per year, with higher earnings losses in earlier calendar years. Denied applicants earn between 
$7,200 and $8,900 per year on average – below the 2009 annualized SGA threshold of $11,760. 
IV estimates range from a high of approximately $2,600 two years later for 2006 determinations 
(compared with $1,600 two years later for 2005 determinations) to a low of a statistically 
insignificant $375 four years after the (2005) initial determination for earnings measured in 
2009. Again, the economy is seen to play an important role in determining the labor supply 
effects of SSDI. Our estimates suggest the marginal denied applicant is worse off than the 
allowed applicant in terms of total income: while the denied applicant does not receive an 
average benefit of roughly $12,000 annually, he only increases his earned income by $1,600-
$2,600. 
 
6.2. Treatment Effect Heterogeneity on the Basis of Observable Characteristics 
 One advantage of our empirical strategy, combined with administrative data, is that it 
allows us to estimate labor supply effects of DI receipt conditional on observable characteristics 
such as impairment type, age or prior earnings.  Tables 5 and 6 present first stage and second 
stage results, respectively, for these disaggregated groups. As shown in Table 5, although the 
instrumental variable is statistically significant in all cases, the strength of the first stage varies 
substantially across groups, particularly by impairment type. For example, the coefficient on 
EXALLOW for musculoskeletal cases is 0.162, compared with 0.350 for mental disorders. 
Angrist and Pischke (2009) show how one can use the first stage coefficient estimates in order to 
characterize the types of individuals most likely to be induced into treatment as a result of the 
instrumental variable (i.e., the marginal entrant).
25
  
Specifically, the relative likelihood that the marginal entrant has a particular observable 
characteristic is given by the ratio of the first stage coefficient conditional on that characteristic 
relative to the overall first stage coefficient. Thus, a policy change that uniformly increased the 
allowance threshold at the initial determination stage would induce onto SSDI individuals who 
were 50% more likely than the average applicant to suffer from a mental disorder, and 30% less 
likely than average to suffer from a musculoskeletal impairment. This is not surprising, given 
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 Note that the monotonicity assumption must be satisfied for this result to hold. 
 23 
that 64% of allowances for mental disorders result from initial determinations, compared with 
38% of allowances for musculoskeletal impairments.
26
  Similarly, a policy that increases the 
allowance threshold at the initial determination stage would be more likely to benefit younger 
applicants and applicants with low prior earnings. Such compositional changes could have 
important implications for government spending even if the disincentive effect of disability 
insurance receipt on labor supply is constant across impairment types. Individuals with mental 
impairments incur annual medical costs that are three times higher than medical costs for 
individuals with relatively mild physical impairments such as back and joint problems and 
cardiovascular problems (Foote and Hogan, 2001).  Individuals with mental impairments also 
spend 50% more time on disability insurance rolls compared to individuals with musculoskeletal 
impairments overall; this figure increases to more than 60% for individuals who enter between 
ages 18-34 (Rupp and Scott, 1996).  
Table 6 presents the estimated effect of disability insurance on labor force participation 
two years after the initial decision disaggregated across groups. In order to improve the precision 
of our estimates, we pooled the 2005 and 2006 samples; however, most of our estimates are still 
too imprecise to make many definitive conclusions. Only five of the fifteen body system codes 
yield IV estimates statistically distinct from OLS, and only two of these are statistically 
distinguishable from zero at the 95% level; not surprisingly, these are musculoskeletal and 
mental impairments, which make up more than half of the sample. The estimated effect for 
special senses and speech is -8 percentage points (significant at the 10% level), and respiratory 
and genitourinary impairments actually yield positive, although not statistically significant, 
estimates. The remaining impairments are not statistically distinguishable from OLS. There does 
not appear to be a pattern between the relative magnitudes of the OLS estimates vs. IV estimates 
for body system codes. 
In contrast, dividing the sample into eight age groups produces interesting results. Note 
that the OLS estimate of the age profile is relatively flat until age 50 and then the magnitude of 
the labor supply effect declines steeply. By contrast, the IV estimate of the age profile gradually 
increases in magnitude until around age 45 before beginning its decline, perhaps reflecting fewer 
employment opportunities for inexperienced or older disabled workers. As a result, the gap 
between OLS and IV decreases with age, until roughly age 45.  Recall the gap between OLS and 
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IV in our model is [ [ | 1] [ | 0]]i i i iE s DI E s DI   , or the difference in average severity of 
allowed vs. denied applicants. Thus, our estimates imply that, in terms of unobserved severity, 
denied applicants more closely resemble allowed applicants as they age. Finally, we estimate that 
disincentive effects of disability insurance are highest for individuals at the very top and very 
bottom of the (pre-onset) income distribution. For poorer individuals, this may reflect lower 
opportunity costs of applying for disability insurance. For more skilled (wealthier) individuals, 
the larger disincentive effect could reflect better (or more accommodating) employment 
opportunities. 
 
6.3. Marginal Treatment Effects 
As noted above, because we instrument for disability insurance receipt using a 
continuous measure of DDS examiners’ allowance propensities, we can trace out the disincentive 
effect of disability insurance as a function of unobserved severity by estimating marginal 
treatment effects. This exercise is particularly interesting in that it tests for heterogeneous 
treatment effects on the basis of unobservables. If the average treatment effect varies over the 
distribution of unobserved severity, then estimates of the disincentive effect based on 
subpopulations of SSDI entrants with different average severity levels are more appropriately 
regarded as local average treatment effects.  
 Figure 7 shows the MTE as a function of predicted SSDI receipt in the range of 55 
percent to 75 percent (with 95% confidence intervals), which encompasses the ultimate 
allowance rate of 65 percent in the present system. At more extreme values of predicted SSDI 
receipt there are relatively smaller numbers of observations and the instrument lacks precision; 
when this occurs, the MTE is not identified. The MTE declines monotonically as the SSDI 
allowance rate increases exogenously; because it is negative in value, as it declines it increases in 
magnitude, implying the disincentive effect of SSDI rises as the allowance threshold is lowered 
and applicants with less severe impairments are allowed on the program. When the allowance 
threshold is particularly high, such that the allowance rate is ten points lower than in the present 
system, the marginal entrant has a high-severity impairment and SSDI causes a modest 10 
percentage point reduction in labor force participation. As the allowance threshold is relaxed, the 
disincentive effect grows. At the mean allowance rate for the present system, SSDI causes a 29 
percentage point reduction in labor force participation. When the allowance threshold is 
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particularly low, such that the allowance rate is 10 points higher than at present, the marginal 
entrant has an impairment of lesser (unobserved) severity, and SSDI causes a 60 percentage 
point reduction in labor force participation. The MTE at the allowance rate corresponding to the 
present system is somewhat larger than the IV estimate of the local average treatment effect 
(LATE) of 21 percentage points. This occurs because the IV estimate is in essence a weighted 
average of the MTEs and depends on the distribution of unobserved severity among applicants, 
which may be skewed toward higher severity cases.  
 Note that our interpretation of the MTE as a function of unobserved severity depends 
critically on two assumptions: (1) the monotonicity assumption already described, and (2) the 
assumption that assignment to initial examiner only effectively randomizes SSDI receipt and not 
some other outcome that independently affects labor supply outcomes. For example, if strict 
examiners tend to process claims more slowly and/or send more applicants into the appeals 
process, then applicants on the margin for strict examiners will tend to spend more time out of 
the labor market while awaiting appeal. If time out of the labor market adversely affects 
employment outcomes (e.g., through signaling to an employer or by depreciating human capital) 
then the MTE will tend to understate the estimated effect of SSDI receipt on labor force 
participation for lower severity applicants (because it also encompasses the effect from longer 
waiting times). Figure 8 presents average initial and final processing times (in days) by predicted 
SSDI receipt given the initial examiner. Note that both very strict and very lenient examiners 
tend to process claims more slowly than the average examiner, although lenient examiners are 
even slower than strict examiners. However, since strict examiners tend to generate more appeals 
than lenient examiners, on average applicants assigned to very strict or very lenient examiners 
tend to have similar final processing times. In any case, the U-shaped pattern in processing times 
by examiner allowance propensity implies that the declining pattern in the MTE (corresponding 
to a disincentive effect that rises in severity) cannot solely be driven by differences in processing 
times. 
 Our finding that the MTE is declining in unobserved severity may explain why the 
French-Song estimate of 14 percentage points is significantly lower than the Chen-van der 
Klaauw estimate of 20 percentage points and our LATE estimate of 21 percentage points. The 
French-Song subsample of applicants who appeal their initial determination likely consists of 
higher-severity individuals on average (i.e., individuals with higher expected returns to appeals); 
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the disincentive effect is smaller for these individuals on account of their lower residual work 
capacity.  While our LATE estimate does not encompass many of those in the French-Song 
sample, the declining pattern in the MTE suggests that their estimate should be lower than ours.
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On the other hand, the Chen-van der Klaauw estimate is based on 55 year olds drawn from the 
middle of the severity distribution (on the margin of vocational allowances) and happens to 
coincide fairly closely with our LATE estimate.   
 From the perspective of policy, our estimates point to markedly greater residual work 
capacity among beneficiaries with (unobservably) less severe impairments.  As noted earlier, in 
the present system, the marginal applicant has a mental impairment, is young, and has low pre-
disability earnings. A policy with the effect of relaxing access to SSDI benefits in the initial 
determination phase would draw individuals from this margin, and as the margin moved down 
the severity distribution, the disincentive effect of SSDI would rise—slowly at first, but 
increasingly faster.   
 
7. Conclusion 
 This paper presents causal estimates of the disincentive effect of the SSDI program on the 
labor supply of program entrants. Ours are the first set of estimates of the disincentive effect 
estimated using the entire population of SSDI applicants in the present day system. In addition, 
our quasi-experimental research design applied to a new administrative data set facilitates 
examination of the important heretofore unanswered policy questions of whether the program 
disincentive effect varies across individuals, to what extent, and in what ways.  In particular, we 
can assess the extent to which the disincentive effect varies with unobservable impairment 
severity.  This is of particular interest since over the last two decades, the SSDI caseload has 
become increasingly dominated by individuals with impairments that are particularly difficult to 
assess, such as mental and musculoskeletal impairments.  
 We find that labor force participation of the marginal entrant would be on average 21 
percentage points greater in the absence of SSDI benefit receipt under ―average‖ economic 
conditions. His or her likelihood of engaging in substantial gainful activity as defined by the 
SSDI program would be on average 13 percentage points higher, and he or she would earn 
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 Although not directly comparable to our estimates, French and Taber (2010) cite estimates of a declining MTE of 
SSDI receipt on earnings, ranging from -$1,500 to -$3,500, based on the data of French and Song (2009).  
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$1,600 to $2,600 more per year on average in the absence of SSDI benefit receipt. We estimate 
that in the present system, nearly one-quarter of applicants are ―marginal‖ cases whose ultimate 
outcome depends on examiner assignment.  The marginal SSDI entrant is more likely to have a 
mental disorder, be younger, and have pre-onset earnings in the lowest earnings quintile. Such 
individuals tend to have higher expected medical costs and greater expected program duration.  
 Importantly, we also find that the SSDI labor supply disincentive effect is not constant 
across individuals. Over a range corresponding to 10 percentage points above and below the 
current system allowance rate, the marginal treatment effect varies from a modest 10 percentage 
point reduction in labor force participation for individuals with impairments characterized by 
high unobservable severity, to a 60 percentage point reduction in labor force participation for 
those with lower unobservable severity. Our estimates point to markedly greater residual work 
capacity among beneficiaries with (unobservably) less severe impairments, and imply that a 
policy with the effect (intended or unintended) of relaxing access to SSDI benefits (regardless of 
impairment type) in the initial determination phase would lead to an increase in the program’s 
labor supply disincentive effect. 
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No. observations 2,380,255 797,447 738,163 249,396 595,249
Percent of sample 100.00% 33.50% 31.01% 10.48% 25.01%
Percent of initial denials -- -- 46.64% 15.76% 37.61%
Initial decision (final step)
   2. Rejected - nonsevere 17.16% 0.00% 18.02% 26.44% 35.20%
   3. Allowed - met listings 14.66% 43.77% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
   4. Rejected - work past jobs 23.64% 0.00% 38.25% 34.31% 32.72%
   5. Rejected - able to work 25.69% 0.00% 43.72% 39.25% 32.06%
   5. Allowed - unable to work 18.84% 56.23% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Body system code
   Musculoskeletal system 37.02% 25.96% 45.01% 43.19% 39.33%
   Special senses and speech 2.46% 3.45% 1.55% 1.85% 2.52%
   Respiratory system 3.95% 5.15% 3.37% 3.55% 3.22%
   Cardiovascular system 8.20% 8.88% 8.78% 6.93% 7.11%
   Digestive system 2.36% 1.87% 2.54% 2.50% 2.72%
   Genitourinary impairments 1.46% 3.11% 0.62% 0.45% 0.73%
   Hematological disorders 0.35% 0.37% 0.31% 0.30% 0.39%
   Skin disorders 0.33% 0.28% 0.31% 0.33% 0.43%
   Endocrine system 4.15% 2.51% 5.29% 4.89% 4.62%
   Neurological 8.16% 11.16% 7.13% 6.22% 6.21%
   Mental disorders 21.59% 27.37% 16.87% 20.21% 20.27%
   Malignant neoplastic diseases 3.37% 5.85% 2.10% 1.20% 2.54%
   Immune system disorders 2.68% 3.01% 2.71% 2.51% 2.26%
   Special/other 3.93% 1.02% 3.41% 5.87% 7.65%
Age at initial decision
   Mean 47.13 50.77 47.38 43.64 43.41
   Std. deviation 10.56 10.83 9.23 10.11 12.06
Avg. earnings, 3-5 years before 
   Mean 22,100 27,918 22,895 15,514 16,078
   Std. deviation 26,879 33,117 24,122 20,853 24,466EXALLOW ( = initial examiner 
allowance rate, less own 
decision)
   Mean 0.37 0.40 0.35 0.35 0.36
   Std. deviation 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.10
Source: DIODS, initial applications decided in 2005-2006
Initially Denied
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Table 2. First Stage Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2005
EXALLOW 0.319*** 0.305*** 0.275*** 0.218*** 0.212*** 0.215*** 0.215***
t-stat 37.7 39.66 32.11 28.06 29.6 27.99 28.02
R-squared 0.013 0.018 0.038 0.094 0.155 0.162 0.162
2006
EXALLOW 0.351*** 0.349*** 0.308*** 0.248*** 0.244*** 0.246*** 0.247***
t-stat 40.82 41.02 36.58 32.34 33.43 32.45 32.67
R-squared 0.014 0.019 0.041 0.098 0.158 0.166 0.166
2005 and 2006
EXALLOW 0.338*** 0.330*** 0.294*** 0.235*** 0.230*** 0.233*** 0.234***
t-stat 50.14 53.13 42.74 37.97 40.31 37.82 38.42
R-squared 0.013 0.018 0.039 0.096 0.156 0.163 0.164
Control variables included
   3-digit zipcode X
   Body system codes X
   Diagnosis codes X X X X
   Age group dummies X X X
   Avg. previous earnings X X
   Month dummies X
No. control variables 110 1014 125 420 428 429 440
Number of observations is 1,208,898 for 2005 and 1,212,842 for 2006.
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Mean of dependent (independent) variable = 0.65 (0.37). 
All regressions include DDS dummies. Pooled specification includes year interacted with month dummies.
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Excluded impairment No. obs.
Coeff. On 
EXALLOW2 t-Stat.
Musculoskeletal System 881,058 0.098 11.13
Special Senses and Speech 58,603 0.426 19.19
Respiratory System 93,941 0.138 7.17
Cardiovascular System 195,183 0.166 10.99
Digestive System 56,119 0.193 6.98
Genitourinary Impairments 34,835 0.093 5.81
Hematological Disorders 8,266 0.407 6.93
Skin Disorders 7,933 0.366 4.7
Endocrine System 98,801 0.065 2.78
Neurological 194,148 0.207 16.1
Mental Disorders 513,884 0.251 21.48
Malignant Neoplastic Diseases 80,251 0.234 12.5
Immune System Disorders 63,765 0.206 7.4
Special/other 93,457 0.077 3.58
Table 3. Alternative First Stage Estimates Using "Leave Body System Out" 
Instrument
Notes: Each row represents a regression of ultimate SSDI receipt on examiner 
allowance rate constructed using pooled 2005-06 cases except those with the same 
body system code. Control variables include: DDS dummies, diagnosis codes, age 
group dummies, avg. previous earnings and month-year dummies. Standard errors 
clustered on examiner. Note 11 cases excluded from musculoskeletal regression that 
belonged to a complete specializer.
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Table 4. Effects of SSDI Receipt on Labor Force Participation & Earnings
Outcome OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
1) Earn >=$1,000/year
   Mean dependent variable | allowed 0.154 0.136 0.114 0.139 0.112
   Mean dependent variable | denied 0.516 0.506 0.458 0.479 0.433
   Coeff. on ALLOW -0.338*** -0.215*** -0.349*** -0.170*** -0.328*** -0.103*** -0.322*** -0.206*** -0.310*** -0.144***
(-326.10) (-6.75) (-338.53) (-5.42) (-318.19) (-3.34) (-304.66) (-8.58) (-287.92) (-6.12)
   R-squared 0.197 0.183 0.211 0.180 0.197 0.143 0.188 0.174 0.181 0.151
2) Earn >= SGA
   Mean dependent variable | allowed 0.052 0.046 0.038 0.045 0.035
   Mean dependent variable | denied 0.286 0.291 0.257 0.256 0.229
   Coeff. on ALLOW -0.235*** -0.129*** -0.244*** -0.109**** -0.218*** -0.066*** -0.215*** -0.108*** -0.197*** -0.088***
(-261.97) (-6.11) (-267.38) (-5.33) (-251.29) (-3.30) (-227.61) (-6.09) (-212.58) (-5.19)
   R-squared 0.143 0.125 0.157 0.126 0.143 0.100 0.133 0.112 0.126 0.102
3) Earnings
   Mean dependent variable | allowed 2,012 1,834 1,628 1,775 1,498
   Mean dependent variable | denied 8,671 8,857 8,104 7,722 7,164
   Coeff. on ALLOW -7,150*** -1,634* -7,343*** -1,562** -6,752*** -375 -6,529*** -2,564*** -6086*** -1508***
(-140.81) (-1.71) (-193.30) (-2.01) (-182.34) (-0.47) (-92.92) (-3.92) (-126.87) (-2.49)
   R-squared 0.131 0.094 0.139 0.093 0.119 0.064 0.134 0.112 0.121 0.087
No. observations 1,174,852 1,152,585 1,123,846 1,205,403 1,173,926
2006 Decisions
2 Years After Decision 3 Years After Decision
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. ALLOW denotes ultimate award decision (rather than initial decision). Control variables include: 
DDS dummies, diagnosis codes, age group dummies, avg. previous earnings, and month dummies.
2 Years After Decision 3 Years After Decision 4 Years After Decision
2005 Decisions
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   Musculoskeletal system 881,069 23.5% 61.2% 0.162*** 17.06 0.69
   Special senses and speech 58,603 47.0% 66.5% 0.439*** 20.47 1.88
   Respiratory system 93,941 43.8% 70.2% 0.142*** 7.33 0.61
   Cardiovascular system 195,183 36.3% 69.5% 0.180*** 11.64 0.77
   Digestive system 56,119 26.6% 60.0% 0.198*** 7.13 0.85
   Genitourinary impairments 34,835 71.1% 84.3% 0.094*** 5.90 0.40
   Hematological disorders 8,266 35.2% 63.1% 0.411*** 6.79 1.76
   Skin disorders 7,933 28.6% 57.3% 0.368*** 4.57 1.57
   Endocrine system 98,801 20.3% 59.8% 0.071*** 2.98 0.30
   Neurological 194,148 45.8% 73.0% 0.220*** 17.21 0.94
   Mental disorders 513,884 42.5% 66.7% 0.350*** 37.12 1.49
   Malignant neoplastic diseases 80,251 58.1% 77.4% 0.253*** 15.76 1.08
   Immune system disorders 63,765 37.7% 69.1% 0.247*** 10.47 1.06
   Special/other 93,457 8.7% 35.6% 0.057** 2.54 0.24
Age at decision
   18-24 78,946 25.6% 40.2% 0.328*** 13.61 1.40
   25-29 136,461 23.0% 42.6% 0.365*** 21.03 1.56
   30-34 156,838 22.8% 48.2% 0.332*** 18.98 1.42
   35-39 211,452 22.4% 52.9% 0.278*** 17.61 1.19
   40-44 295,526 21.5% 56.6% 0.222*** 16.63 0.95
   45-49 370,632 22.4% 62.7% 0.195*** 16.08 0.83
   50-54 399,274 32.0% 72.9% 0.181*** 18.56 0.77
   55-59 413,497 50.1% 81.6% 0.148*** 17.59 0.63
   60-64 317,629 57.1% 72.5% 0.279*** 24.74 1.19
Avg. prior earnings
   Bottom quintile 476,051 22.1% 44.2% 0.409*** 30.62 1.75
   2nd quintile 476,051 27.2% 59.0% 0.254*** 25.08 1.09
   3rd quintile 476,051 31.8% 66.9% 0.199*** 20.85 0.85
   4th quintile 476,051 38.4% 73.3% 0.181*** 19.76 0.77
   Top quintile 476,051 48.0% 79.3% 0.158*** 19.84 0.68
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Control variables include: DDS dummies, diagnosis 














   Musculoskeletal system 881,069 0.125 0.509 -0.349*** -303.13 -0.195*** -4.33
   Special senses and speech 58,603 0.209 0.523 -0.295*** -69.27 -0.084* -1.71
   Respiratory system 93,941 0.099 0.457 -0.294*** -81.97 0.108 0.80
   Cardiovascular system 195,183 0.116 0.451 -0.316*** -131.96 -0.332*** -4.43
   Digestive system 56,119 0.157 0.516 -0.344*** -80.89 -0.310** -2.46
   Genitourinary impairments 34,835 0.192 0.532 -0.310*** -36.77 0.470 1.38
   Hematological disorders 8,266 0.242 0.586 -0.322*** -28.43 -0.044 -0.27
   Skin disorders 7,933 0.158 0.555 -0.374*** -34.70 -0.604*** -3.25
   Endocrine system 98,801 0.127 0.460 -0.308*** -101.82 -0.396 -1.39
   Neurological 194,148 0.124 0.530 -0.368*** -140.74 -0.263*** -4.60
   Mental disorders 513,884 0.186 0.532 -0.317*** -204.78 -0.212*** -7.78
   Malignant neoplastic diseases 80,251 0.211 0.607 -0.377*** -93.44 -0.316*** -4.67
   Immune system disorders 63,765 0.174 0.521 -0.314*** -64.24 -0.163 -1.64
   Special/other 93,457 0.133 0.318 -0.253*** -70.09 -0.636 -1.60
Age at decision
   18-24 78,946 0.363 0.698 -0.340*** -88.45 -0.228*** -3.07
   25-29 136,461 0.273 0.610 -0.357*** -109.80 -0.110** -2.28
   30-34 156,838 0.232 0.586 -0.376*** -124.77 -0.221*** -4.28
   35-39 211,452 0.205 0.566 -0.384*** -171.92 -0.248*** -4.53
   40-44 295,526 0.174 0.523 -0.370*** -197.96 -0.287*** -5.20
   45-49 370,632 0.148 0.490 -0.359*** -200.68 -0.314*** -5.79
   50-54 399,274 0.127 0.466 -0.360*** -204.98 -0.299*** -5.73
   55-59 413,497 0.102 0.402 -0.323*** -152.58 -0.186*** -3.36
   60-64 317,629 0.096 0.217 -0.134*** -79.26 -0.107*** -3.33
Avg. prior earnings
   Bottom quintile 476,051 0.148 0.332 -0.181*** -141.19 -0.176*** -8.66
   2nd quintile 476,051 0.164 0.530 -0.337*** -232.30 0.022 0.46
   3rd quintile 476,051 0.149 0.582 -0.405*** -266.42 -0.062 -1.17
   4th quintile 476,051 0.135 0.606 -0.444*** -277.59 -0.225*** -4.70
   Top quintile 476,051 0.141 0.597 -0.429*** -247.30 -0.156*** -2.91
OLS IV
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Control variables include: diagnosis 
codes, age group dummies, avg. previous earnings, DDS dummies and month dummies.




























Years after initial decision
Figure 1. Labor Force Participation Before and After Initial Decision
2005 Decisions





















Years after initial decision
Figure 2. % Performing Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA) Before and After Initial Decision
2005 Decisions

















Years after initial decision
Figure 3. Mean Earnings Before and After Initial Decision
2005 Decisions
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Source: DIODS data for 2005 and 2006. Examiners with 10 - 900 decisions only.
Confidence intervals shown with dashed lines.
Labor force participation measured in the second year after the initial decision.
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Figure 6. Estimated Effects of SSDI Receipt on Labor Force 
Participation
2005 decisions - OLS 2005 decisions - IV 2006 decisions - OLS 2006 decisions - IV
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Source: DIODS data for 2005 and 2006. Examiners with 10 - 900 decisions only.
Confidence intervals shown with dashed lines.
Labor force participation measured in the second year after initial decision.
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Source: DIODS data for 2005 and 2006. Examiners with 10 - 900 decisions only.
Confidence intervals shown with dashed lines.
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Automated and Manual Allocation of Claims to Disability Examiners 
 
This appendix describes the allocation of SSDI claims to disability examiners in 2005 
and 2006 based on interviews with managers in the Disability Determination Services (DDSs) 
that had the most initial determinations in 2006. These twelve DDSs processed 40 percent of the 
claims in our sample in 2006.
1
 
The vast majority of initial claims for adults were allocated to examiners using software 
developed by Iron Data LLC. While this software is currently still in use, SSA announced in 
January 2011 that it will switch to a new processing system that will be provided by Lockheed 
Martin with Iron Data LLC acting as a subcontractor. 
The existing software allocates disability cases to examiners based on the availability of 
examiners. Managers at DDSs have described this process as a “round robin,” “next in line,” 
“rotate to the back,” and “equal distribution” system. The case characteristics do not affect the 
distribution in any way, except in special circumstances described below. Allocations are done 
frequently – daily in many DDSs, continuously in others – and case characteristics are not known 
beforehand. 
DDS staff utilize an electronic interface that for each specific allocation defines the 
availability of examiners for specific types of cases. There are generally three levels of examiner 
availability; they can be available for 1) initial claims only, 2) initial claims plus 
reconsiderations, or 3) initial claims and reconsiderations plus continuing disability reviews.
2
 
Thus, all examiners were available for initial adult cases during the analysis period. Although all 
examiners were not available with equal probabilities,
3
 the probability of assignment to a 
particular examiner given availability did not vary across initial adult claims. The particular 
assignment of a claim to an examiner depended merely on the order of the receipt of claims and 
                                                          
1
 We intererviewed managers at the ten largest DDSs as well as in two states that are known to have used their own 
computer software to allocate cases during the analysis period, New York and Missouri. 
2
 Names for these classifications of examiners vary among DDSs. Some DDSs have additional levels corresponding 
to child cases or other types of specializations. Trainees are also generally in a unique classification. Some DDSs 
allocated cases to trainees through the Iron Data system and some allocated them manually. The trainee period 
varied among DDSs; a range of 3 to 18 months was described by DDS managers.  
3
 For example, the number of claims that could be assigned to levels 2 and 3 examiners can be constrained by the 
number of reconsiderations and continuing disability reviews that have already been assigned. Some managers 
indicated that these claims are assigned before initial claims are assigned. Also, trainees generally process fewer 
claims on a daily or weekly basis. 
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the order of the previous allocation. That is, an examiner was placed at the back of the queue of 
available examiners upon being allocated a claim. 
The most common exception to computer allocation is for claims that are marked as high 
priority by the field offices and, thus, qualify for expedited handling. These claims are more 
quickly processed by a parallel team of examiners. In some DDSs, these examiners only work on 
expedited cases and, in some DDSs, the teams overlap. Further, some DDSs use the Iron Data 
system to allocate expedited claims and some do it manually. The types of expedited claims 
include: 
 Quick Disability Determinations (QDD); 
 Compassionate Allowances (CAL) ; 
 Military Service Casualties (“Wounded warriors”); and 
 Terminal Illness cases. 
Expedited claims comprise a very small portion of our sample during 2005 and 2006. One reason 
is that QDD and CAL were begun after this period.
4
 Another reason is that the number of 
Military Service Casualties was a very small percentage of the total.
5
 Finally, Terminal Illness 
cases were more common but very few of these individuals survive to the second year after the 
initial determination, and therefore do not qualify for our sample.
6
 
Another parallel system of allocation exists for claims for which the manager decides to 
allocate manually. In cases where there is a conflict of interest, the claims are commonly sent to 
another DDS for processing. In cases where the claim has a large amount of publicity or is the 
subject of a court case, the manager may assign a senior examiner. DDS managers indicated that 
these cases occur between less than once a month up to several times a month. 
Some examiners have Single Decision Maker (SDM) authority, which allows them to 
make a determination without the use of medical consultants. While the extent and 
                                                          
4
 The national rollouts of QDD and CAL were in September 2007 and October 2008 respectively. 
5
 An audit by SSA’s Office of the Inspector General found 7,127 such cases in 2008, or less than 0.3 percent of 
determinations. See Social Security Administration, Office of the Inspector General, Military Service Casualty 
Cases, December 2009, A-01-09-29056. 
6
 Terminal illness cases are characterized by allegations that the impairment cannot be reversed and is expected to 
end in death. According to SSA’s management data, there were 44,904 Terminal Illness cases in 2007, or 3.5 
percent of all initial claims. Further, an internal SSA study of 15,970 Terminal Illness allowances for 2005 found 
that the one-year survival rate from the time of allowance was around 11 percent. It follows that very few of these 
claims will be observed in our data because claimants who did not survive completely through the second year after 
the initial decision were dropped. In order to be observed in the data, claimants would need to survive for between 
two years (if the decision was on the last day of the year) and three years (if the decision was on the first day of the 
year).  
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implementation of SDM authority varies greatly across states, none of the DDS managers 
indicated that SDM authority affects the allocation of claims. In other words, where SDM 
authority exists, it is not used to define the availability of examiners in the electronic interface.  
On balance, while nearly all claims were allocated randomly by computer to examiners 
on the basis of availability, a small percent were assigned nonrandomly. As a percentage of 
initial claims, however, the exceptions to the standard processes were a very small part of the 
caseload in 2005 and 2006. We estimate that all of the exceptions discussed here sum to less 
than 0.5 percent of our sample of applications. This low percent reflects the facts that most high-
priority cases at this time were for Terminal Illness, and consequently, most of these individuals 
did not survive long enough to be included in our sample. 
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